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Appeal No. 20070159 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18a-l(l)(a) (2003) and UTAH R. APP. P. 3(a) provide this 
Court with jurisdiction over this appeal from the Minutes entered on January 22, 2007, 
(the "Judgment") by the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, involving three (3) third-degree felony convictions from a court of record. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT OF 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE #1: Was Draper's trial counsel ineffective for failing to call a handwriting 
expert? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the 
first time on appeal presents a question of law" that this Court reviews for correctness. 
State v. Clark. 2004 UT 25, [^6, 89 P.3d 162. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of 
counsel, '"a defendant must show (1) that counsel's performance was so deficient as to 
fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient 
performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have 
been different.'" Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 72, % 19, 61 P.3d 978 (quoting State v. 
Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 243 (Utah 1995)); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
686-87, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
ISSUE #2: Did the trial court commit plain error or was Draper's trial counsel 
ineffective for failing to require establishment of a foundation for the lay 
person's testimony respecting Draper's handwriting, in violation of UT. R. 
EVID. 901? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "We review decisions relating to the qualification of a 
witness as an expert or as a lay witness for an abuse of discretion." See Hardy v. Hardy, 
776 P.2d 917, 925 (Utah Ct.App.1989), State v. Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App 226, %9, 95 
P.3d 1193. "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal 
presents a question of law" that this Court reviews for correctness. State v. Clark, 2004 
UT 25, f6, 89 P.3d 162. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, "'a defendant 
must show (1) that counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective 
standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.'" Wickham 
v. Galetka, 2002 UT 72, Tfl9, 61 P.3d 978 (quoting State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 243 
(Utah 1995)); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
80L.Ed.2d674(1984). 
ISSUE #3: Was the evidence sufficient for a jury to convict Draper of forgery beyond a 
reasonable doubt? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, we 
reverse a jury verdict only when the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt." State v. 
2 
Boss, 2005 UT App. 520, f9, 127 P.3d 1236 citing State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58,1J65, 27 
P.3d 1115 (quotations and citations omitted). "We examine the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the verdict." Id; see State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^18, 70 P.3d 111. "So 
long as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings of 
all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." Id. 
citing Mead, 2001 UT 58 at ^ 67, 27 P.3d 1115 (quotations and citation omitted). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
A. UNITED STATES CONST. AMEND. VI 
B. UTAH CONST. ART. 1, § 12 
C. UTAH R. EVID. 701, 702 and 901 
D. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-501 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 3, 2005, Ryan Leon Draper ("Draper") was charged by Information 
with three (3) counts of third-degree felony Forgery and three (3) class B misdemeanor 
counts of Theft by Deception. Record on Appeal (hereinafter "R") at 0007-0010. On 
August 11, 2005, Draper's trial counsel, Roger A. Kraft ("Kraft") entered his appearance 
to represent Draper in the proceedings. R0012. Draper was bound over for trial on January 
10, 2006. R0028-0029. Draper requested a jury trial as reflected by the Minutes dated 
January 30, 2006. R0036-0037. Draper's one (1) day trial was held on October 26, 2006, 
and, on that same date, the jury found Draper guilty of the three (3) counts of third-degree 
felony Forgery and not-guilty of the three (3) class B misdemeanor counts of Theft by 
Deception in their verdict dated October 26, 2006 (the "Verdict"). R0107-0112. Draper 
was sentenced to three (3) indeterminate terms not to exceed five (5) years in the Utah 
State Prison, to be served consecutively. R0124-0126. The trial court suspended the 
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sentence and ordered Draper to serve forty-five (45) days in jail forthwith, to pay $431.74 
as restitution to the victim, and placed Draper on probation with Adult Probation and 
Parole for thirty-six (36) months (the "Judgment''). R0125-0126. Draper filed his Motion 
to Reconsider Sentence and Allow Electronic Monitoring on February 1, 2006, which was 
denied by the trial court on February 20, 2006. R0129. 
Draper timely filed his Notice of Appeal with this Court on February 22, 2007, 
which reflects Draper's retention of new counsel for his appeal in this matter. R0133. The 
Docketing Statement was filed on March 13, 2007. On July 5, 2007, Draper filed Motion 
for Rule 23(b) Remand ("Motion for Remand"), which was granted and this Court 
ordered the trial court to hold a hearing and enter findings of fact concerning Draper's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in an Order dated August 28, 2007. R0143, 0145, 
0183, 0232. The hearing concerning Draper's ineffective assistance of counsel claims was 
heard in the trial court on June 6, 2008 (the Remand Hearing"). R0263. The Findings of 
Fact resulting from the Remand Hearing was filed on July 14, 2008, and are attached 
hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by this reference (the "Findings"). R0265. 
On July 30, 2008, Draper filed Motion for Summary Reversal Based on Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel Claims and Memorandum in Support ("Motion for Summary 
Reversal"). Id, This Court denied the Motion for Summary Reversal on August 22, 2008. 
Id 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
L THE TRIAL 
A. Brenda Dunvon's Testimony, 
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On June 29, 2005, Brenda Dunyon ("Dunyon") lived at 4641 West Richfield 
Avenue, Salt Lake County. Transcript (hereinafter "Tr.") at p. 11. Dunyon had an air 
conditioner that needed maintenance. Tr. at pp. 11-12. Dunyon called Air Comfort, who 
sent Draper to make the required repair for Dunyon. Tr. at p. 12. Dunyon identified 
Draper as the person who repaired her air conditioner. Id. Draper worked on Dunyon's air 
conditioner for approximately thirty (30) minutes before he went to his truck, exchanged 
money with Dunyon, and wrote out a receipt for her. Tr. at p. 13. State's Exhibit No. 3 
was introduced as Dunyon's receipt for $185.00 cash which she signed. See, State's 
Exhibit No. 3, which is included in the record on appeal, and Tr. at p. 15. Dunyon's bill, 
as explained to her by Draper, was for about $183.00. Tr. at p. 16. The State introduced 
another receipt, which indicated discrepancies in the amount charged to Dunyon and in 
her signature on the receipt. See, State's Exhibit No. 4 and Tr. at pp. 17-18. Dunyon 
testified that she had signed one (1) receipt for Draper on June 29, 2005, and received one 
(1) receipt from him. Tr. at p. 18. Dunyon testified that the capacitor of her air conditioner 
was empty and cost $133.55 for its repair. Tr. at p. 20. Dunyon also testified that it there 
was a $70.00 diagnostic fee, which totaled $183.55 for the total repair. Tr. at pp. 20-21. 
Dunyon did not complain about the price or how the work was performed. Tr. at pp. 21-
22. 
B. Vance Hansen's Testimony. 
On April 30, 2005, Vance Hansen ("Hansen") lived at 530 Wood Avenue in Salt 
Lake City, Salt Lake County. Tr. at p. 24. Hansen called Air Comfort to repair the 
problem he was having with the thermostat on his furnace. Id. Hansen identified Draper as 
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the repairman that Air Comfort sent. Tr. at pp. 24-25. The State introduced its Exhibit No. 
5, which Hansen identified as the receipt given to him by Draper for the work Draper 
performed on Hansen's furnace. See, Exhibit No. 5 and Tr. at p. 26. Hansen signed the 
receipt which indicates a $35.00 diagnostic fee and $32.04 for leveling and calibrating the 
thermostat, totaling $67.04, which Hansen paid in cash. Tr. at p. 27, 33. The State then 
introduced its Exhibit No. 6, which reflected to Hansen a discrepancy in his signature 
when compared to Exhibit No. 5. Tr. at pp. 28-29. Hansen testified that he was satisfied 
with Draper's work as the furnace did not have further problems. Tr. at p. 33. 
C. Mark C. Norton's Testimony. 
Mark C. Norton ("Norton") is good friends with Ralph Goff ("Goff'). Tr. at p. 35. 
Norton was at Goff s home at 14th West 4th South in Salt Lake County on July 1, 2005, to 
take Goff somewhere but Goff could not leave until the air conditioner technician 
completed the repair. Tr. at p. 35-36. Norton identified the technician as Draper. Tr. at p. 
36. Norton was present when Draper presented Goff with the bill for the repair which was 
"four hundred and some-odd dollars, and some change." Id. Goff was unable to produce 
the change the bill required, so Draper "did him a favor and knocked the change off." Tr. 
at p. 37. Thinking that the bill was unreasonable, Norton called Air Comfort. Tr. at p. 38. 
Norton spoke with Cory from Air Comfort and told him that the prices were unreasonable, 
that they "don't seem right." Id. During the course of the conversation, Cory indicated that 
the receipt he had did not coincide with the prices Norton was complaining about; Norton 
drove Goff to Air Comfort to straighten things out. Tr. at pp. 38-39. Norton testified that 
Cory compared his paperwork to what Goff had. Tr. at p. 39. Norton testified that Goff 
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indicated that the signature on Cory's paperwork was not Goff s. Id. Norton is not familiar 
with what Air Comfort charges their customers for parts and is not a certified heating and 
air technician. Tr. at pp. 40-41. Norton was upset when he saw the itemization on Goff s 
receipt and testified that was why he called Air Comfort to inquire further. Tr. at p. 41. 
D. Ralph GoffTs Testimony. 
On July 1, 2005, Goff was residing at 1411 West and 400 South, Apartment 3B in 
Salt Lake County. Tr. at p. 43. Goff had previously gone three (3) summers without his air 
conditioner working properly and determined to have it fixed for the coming summer. Id. 
Goff called Air Comfort to have his air conditioner fixed. Id. Goff identified Draper as the 
technician sent by Air Comfort. Tr. at p. 44. When Draper arrived, Goff joked to Draper, 
"I hope this isn't over $420 or so, because thaf s all I have got." Tr. at p. 45. The State 
introduced Exhibit No. 1, which Goff indentified as the receipt he signed and was given 
by Draper on the day in question. See, State's Exhibit No. 1 and Tr. at pp. 45-46. Exhibit 
No. 1 indicates a total of $421.70, which Goff testified Draper dropped down $10.00 to 
give Goff "a break." Tr. at pp. 46-47. The air conditioner was still not working the next 
day on July 2, 2005, and Norton convinced Goff to call Air Comfort to see if he could get 
something back on it. Tr. at p. 48. Goff and Norton went to Air Comfort and met with 
Cory. Tr. at p. 48. The State introduced its Exhibit No. 2, which reflected a total of 
$122.00 and a signature that was not Goff s. Tr. at p. 49. Goff testified that he had not 
signed more than one receipt when Draper was working on his air conditioner. Tr. at pp. 
49-50. Draper worked on the air conditioner for several hours on the day in question. Tr. 
at p. 50. Goff ended up replacing the air conditioner. Tr. at p. 51. The itemized section on 
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the receipt that Goff received from Draper indicates a charge of $112.91 for replacing a 
connector; $139.15 for the breaker; a 20 amp fuse for $25.00; and, an unintelligible entry 
for $119.64; altogether totaling $431.70. Tr. at p. 52. Goff paid $421.00 in cash to Draper. 
Tr. at p. 52. Goff testified that his air conditioner still did not work after Draper repaired it 
and he felt overcharged. Tr. at pp. 53-54. 
E. Cory Hansen's Testimony. 
Previously referred to herein as Cory, Cory Hansen is the Client Fulfillment 
Director of Air Comfort (hereinafter "Cory")- Tr. at p. 56. Draper was a former employee 
of Air Comfort having worked for them approximately from June 2003 through part of 
July 2005. Tr. at p. 57. Air Comfort's policy for cash payments requires the work order to 
be signed by the customer and that the technician is responsible to alert the office that he 
is in possession of a cash receipt. Tr. at p. 60. When the cash payment is brought to the 
office by a technician, the technician is required to sign and initial "from whoever 
received the cash, and it's usually the accountants or the dispatcher or service 
coordinator." Tr. at p. 61. Cory was able to discern from the State's Exhibit No. 6, which 
reflects a cash payment of $35.00 that Draper signed as the technician performing a repair 
for Hansen. Tr. at p. 62. Cory indicated that State's Exhibit No. 4 was signed by Draper 
and two (2) other employees, which acknowledges that $85.00 was received. Tr. at p. 65. 
State's Exhibit No. 4 was for Dunyon and reflects a charge of $85.00. Id. State's Exhibit 
No. 2, the receipt or invoice from Goff s repair, was identified by Cory as having Draper's 
signature and handwriting. Tr. at p. 66. 
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Cory testified that typically when a technician arrives at a call there's a diagnostic 
charge for the discovery of a problem, any repairs are described in the invoice, and any 
"parts codes can be used to identify what was charged." Tr. at p. 66-67. Cory testified that 
technicians ordinarily fill out that section of the invoice. Tr. at p. 67. Cory further testified 
that he was familiar with Draper's handwriting and identified the writing on State's 
Exhibits No. 2, 4, and 6 as Draper's. Id. 
When Nprton called to complain about Goff s bill of $420, Cory located the 
invoice, which was State's Exhibit No. 2. Tr. at p. 68. Cory reported to Norton that Goff 
had been charged $122.00 and determined to investigate the discrepancy further. Id. At 
some point, Norton and Goff came to Air Comfort with their invoice. Id. Cory arranged 
similar meetings with Dunyon and Hansen. Tr. at pp. 68-69. Cory called Draper to inform 
him of the discrepancy of Goff s invoice and asked Draper what happened. Tr. at p. 69. 
Cory testified that Draper's response was, "they were lying." Tr. at p. 70. Cory testified 
that Draper told him that State's Exhibit No. 2 reflected the correct charge of $122 and 
that was the figure he had charged Goff. Id. Draper was subsequently suspended from 
working at Air Comfort. Tr. at p. 71. Cory went over cash receipts for the preceding 
months and located Dunyon and Hansen, who were still in possession of their receipts 
from Draper's repairs. Id. 
Cory and police officers met with Draper on July 18, 2005. Id. Draper was arrested. 
Tr. at p. 72. Cory pulled all cash payment invoices, not just Draper's, to investigate further 
into Norton and Goff s complaint. Tr. at pp. 75-76. Technicians are required to turn their 
work invoices in to the service coordinator upon completing a repair. Tr. at p. 77. Nicole 
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Matheny ("Matheny") was the service coordinator and the first person to receive the 
invoices turned in by all technicians. Id. It is not uncommon for technicians to turn in 
cash. Id. Matheny's employment was terminated shortly after the discrepancies with the 
invoices were discovered. Tr. at pp. 78-79. Cory testified that Matheny had handled 
State's Exhibits No. 2, 4, and 6 and the cash Draper turned in. Tr. at p. 81. Cory was not 
aware that Matheny had previously been convicted of multiple counts of forgery on 
multiple occasions. Tr. at p. 82. 
Air Comfort's policy regarding cash payment usually requires that the cash go 
directly into accounting. Tr. at p. 83. Cory testified that, while the procedure is not 
difficult, the procedure is not always followed. Tr. at pp. 87-88. Cory testified that, if the 
handwriting on the invoices at issue was not Draper's, it was a good imitation of Draper's 
handwriting. Tr. at p. 89. Cory was surprised that Matheny was currently in prison for 
forgery charges and evidence of her criminal record was introduced. See, Defense Exhibit 
No. 1 and Tr. at pp. 88-89. 
F. The Verdict 
The State rested its case at the conclusion of Cory's testimony. Tr. at p. 89. Draper 
moved to dismiss, which was denied by the trial court. Tr. at pp. 90-92. Draper did not 
present any witnesses on his behalf. Tr. at p. 92. After closing arguments, the jury 
deliberated and, after a short time, returned with the Verdict of guilty on three (3) counts 
of third-degree felony Forgery and not guilty on three (3) counts of class-B misdemeanor 
Theft by Deception. Tr. at p. 143. 
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EL THE REMAND HEARING 
A. Testimony of Roger A. Kraft 
Kraft, Draper's trial counsel, testified at the Remand Hearing pursuant to a 
subpoena. Supplemental Transcript (hereinafter "Supp, Tr.") at p. 1. Kraft was retained 
as Draper's trial counsel pursuant to a written contract between himself and Draper. Supp. 
Tr. at p. 3. Kraft testified that it was his position at trial that the alleged forged documents 
were not forged by Draper. Supp. Tr. at p. 4. Kraft testified that forensic document 
examination would not be within the purview of a lay person. Supp. Tr. at p. 5. 
Kraft was unable to recall specifics of meetings with Draper. Supp. Tr. at pp. 6-7. 
Kraft was unable to recall when he had discussed with Draper about the possibility of 
hiring an expert witness, specifically a graphologist, to determine whether the handwriting 
on the alleged forged invoices was Draper's. Supp. Tr. at pp. 7-8. It is standard procedure 
for Kraft to either talk to colleagues about experts or search the Internet for one. Supp. Tr. 
at p. 8. Kraft knew that at some point he and Draper discussed the possibility of hiring an 
expert, but could not recall specifically when. Id. Kraft agreed that an expert would 
generally be required if a lay person could not testify to forensic document examination 
since it is not within a lay person's purview. Supp. Tr. at p. 9. 
Kraft was unsure if he had, while playing devil's advocate, told Draper that the 
alleged forged invoices looked similar to Draper's handwriting, but would not deny 
saying such a thing of Draper testified as such. Supp. Tr. at pp. 9-10. When Draper came 
in to make a payment to Kraft, Kraft told Draper that an expert may be required for this 
kind of case. Supp. Tr. at pp. 11-12. Kraft was unable to recall exactly when they 
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determined not to hire an expert. Supp. Tr. at p. 12. Kraft thought that it was a joint 
decision and that Draper relied heavily on Kraft's advice not to hire an expert. Id 
Kraft testified that finding an expert to testify was never an issue. Supp. Tr. at p. 
13. Kraft testified that he had contacted Linda Cropp ("Cropp") while handling another 
forgery case while he was representing Draper. Id. However, Kraft never consulted with 
an expert concerning Draper's case. Supp. Tr. at pp. 13-14. Kraft testified that the State 
had not provided him with notice of their intent to call an expert witness at trial, which 
factored into Kraft's advice to Draper not to hire an expert. Supp. Tr. at p. 14. 
Counsel herein questioned Kraft as to the foundation laid before Cory when he 
testified at the trial concerning his familiarity of Draper's handwriting, to which there was 
no objection made by Kraft at trial. Supp. Tr. at pp. 15-17. Kraft referred Draper to 
counsel herein to represent Draper on appeal. Supp. Tr. at p. 19. When discussing 
Draper's case with counsel herein, Kraft could not recall whether he had indicated he 
could not locate an expert when preparing Draper's case for trial. Supp. Tr. at pp. 19-20. 
Kraft presented Draper's defense as Matheny being the employee who forged documents 
and stole the money. Supp. Tr. at pp. 22-23. Kraft attempted to have Matheny present at 
Draper's trial in order to call her as a witness, but opted to admit her entire criminal record 
into evidence when issues arose with Matheny's transportation from prison to the trial. 
Supp. Tr. at pp. 23-24. Kraft was very surprised when Draper was convicted. Supp. Tr. at 
p. 24. In fact, Kraft testified, "in my opinion I didn't think a reasonable jury on earth 
would have convicted Ryan knowing that the person taking the invoices and taking the 
money were sitting in a penitentiary for the same type of behavior." Supp. Tr. at p. 23. 
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Kraft knew the channels necessary to obtain an expert and, in hindsight, an expert 
in Draper's case may have been desirable. Supp. Tr. at p. 25. Another factor considered 
by Kraft in deciding not to hire an expert was cost. Supp. Tr. at p. 26. A third factor in 
Kraft's decision was the State's perceived decision not to call an expert and, if Draper did 
not hire an expert, there would not be a "battle of experts" at trial. Id. Yet the factor 
mainly relied upon was that Matheny was incarcerated, which Kraft viewed as 
overwhelmingly in favor of Draper. Id. 
Kraft testified that his trial strategy to rely on Matheny's criminal record and 
current incarceration as Draper's defense at trial was regrettable. Supp. Tr. at p. 27. There 
was no actual testimony or direct evidence produced by the defense that it was not 
Draper's handwriting on the alleged forged documents at trial. Supp. Tr. at pp. 27-28. 
Draper was initially going to testify in his defense at trial; however, upon Kraft's advice 
against it, Draper did not. Supp. Tr. at p. 28. Kraft did not make a motion to the trial court 
to have an expert appointed and paid for by the court before Draper's trial. Supp. Tr. at p. 
29. 
B. Testimony of Linda Lee Cropp. 
Cropp is a forensic document examiner and forensic handwriting analyst. Supp. Tr. 
at p. 30. Cropp is certified by the American College of Forensic Examiners, the 
International Graphoanalysis Society, Utah Peace Officers Association, and the National 
Association of Document Examiners. Supp. Tr. at p. 31. Cropp has been actively 
practicing since 1991. Id. Cropp has previously been qualified as an expert in court. Supp. 
Tr. at pp. 31-32. Cropp used examples of Draper's handwriting prior to his case arising to 
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compare with State's Exhibits No. 2, 4, and 6 used at his trial. Supp. Tr. at p. 32. Cropp 
requested examples of Draper's numerals, printing, and cursive handwriting to aid her in 
her analysis. Id. Cropp also tested Draper's handwriting for its different aspects. Id. 
Cropp explained that, in analyzing and comparing handwriting samples, certain 
gradations of strength of opinion are used, with "most probably" being the highest degree 
of certainty. Supp. Tr. at p. 33. "[P]robably" is a step removed from "most probably." 
Supp. Tr. at p. 34. Cropp found State's Exhibit No. 2 as "probably not written by Mr. 
Draper." Id. Cropp found State's Exhibit No. 4 and 6 as "most probably was not" written 
by Draper. Supp. Tr. at p. 35. 
Cropp testified that she did not recall being contacted by Kraft. Id. Based upon her 
record-keeping, Cropp did not record an entry of Kraft calling about any case during the 
relevant time period of Draper's court proceedings. Supp. Tr. at p. 36. Cropp testified that 
another handwriting analyst could have reached a different conclusion in regards to 
whether Draper was the author of the alleged forged documents. Supp. Tr. at pp. 38-39. 
Cropp examined every numeral on the State's Exhibit No. 2, 4, and 6 and 
concluded that each numeral was either "probably" or "most probably" not written by 
Draper. Supp. Tr. at p. 47. The gradations of strength of opinion are required by the 
American Standards of Testing and Measurement to be responded to by Cropp. Supp. Tr. 
at pp. 46-47. Cropp can only apply the highest standard of absolute certainty of whether a 
person wrote something if she actually witnessed the person writing it. Supp. Tr. at p. 48. 
Cropp testified that it would not be in the lay person's purview to be able to see through a 
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forgery. Supp. Tr. at p. 54. Cropp testified that a lay person could sometimes recognize 
handwriting they are familiar with. Supp. Tr. at p. 56. 
C. Testimony of Ryan Leon Draper. 
Draper and his wife met with Kraft in the fall of 2005 and signed a fee agreement 
with Kraft. Supp. Tr. at p. 63. Draper testified that, after they (meaning Kraft and Draper) 
received discovery from the State, they would move forward in locating an expert witness 
to testify on Draper's behalf at trial. Supp. Tr. at pp. 64-65. When they received 
discovery, Kraft told Draper "he would see what he could find." Supp. Tr. at p. 65. Kraft 
told Draper he would talk to colleagues or look on the Internet to locate an expert. Supp. 
Tr. at p. 66. 
Draper testified that he wanted an expert, "no matter what." Id. Draper let Kraft 
know that he wanted an expert. Id. Draper would ask Kraft how the search for an expert 
was proceeding every month or so, to which Kraft would answer he was still looking and 
had colleagues looking into it as well. Id. Draper said he met with Kraft about twelve (12) 
times before trial and, after discovery, inquired about the search for an expert at every 
meeting. Supp. Tr. at pp. 66-67. 
When the trial date got closer, Kraft told Draper he had been unable to locate an 
expert witness. Supp. Tr. at p. 67. Kraft also told Draper that the colleagues who had been 
looking into it were also unable to refer him to an expert. Id. Draper then asked Kraft if he 
could do anything to locate an expert, to which Kraft reassured Draper that he had done 
everything he could to find an expert. Supp. Tr. at pp. 67-68. 
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Draper testified that he was just told "no" by Kraft about an expert. Supp. Tr. at p. 
68. Draper testified that he never agreed that he did not need an expert and didn't go along 
with the decision not to hire an expert. Id. Kraft told Draper that he felt the defense was 
sufficiently strong enough without an expert. Id. Draper testified that they did discuss the 
fact that the State had not provided notice of its intent to call an expert to analyze the 
handwriting on the alleged forged documents. Supp. Tr. at p. 69. Draper testified that the 
critical issue about his case was whether it was Draper's handwriting on the alleged 
forged documents. Id. 
Draper testified that he had received letters from attorneys after his arrest but opted 
to hire Kraft pursuant to a referral from his bankruptcy attorney. Supp. Tr. at pp. 70-71. 
Kraft was more affordable for Draper than other criminal attorneys. Supp. Tr. at p. 71. 
Draper never told the Court at the hearings in which Kraft represented him that he was in 
financial distress and would like a court appointed attorney. Supp. Tr. at p. 72. Draper 
never informed the judge at the hearings that he had a problem with Kraft. Id. Draper 
never informed the judge on the day of the trial that he wanted an expert witness or was 
uncomfortable proceeding without one. Supp. Tr. at p. 73. Draper did not make an issue 
about not having an expert witness until after he was convicted. Supp. Tr. at pp. 73-74. 
Draper testified that, due to his lack of knowledge of the legal system, he relied on Kraft's 
advice. Supp. Tr. at p. 74. When Kraft told Draper he had been unable to locate an expert 
for trial, he advised Draper to proceed without one. Supp. Tr. at pp. 74-75. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
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The Utah Supreme Court has recently determined that, "the purpose of the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance 
necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding ... any deficiencies in 
counsel's performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective 
assistance under the Constitution." State v. Eyre, 2008 UT 16, If 17, 179 P.3d 792 citing 
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 691-692, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, " 'a defendant must show (1) that 
counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.'" Wickham v. 
Galetka, 2002 UT 72, {^19, 61 P.3d 978 (quoting State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 243 (Utah 
1995)); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
The Utah Supreme Court has found that UTAH R. EVID. 701 "does not allow for 
admission of testimony based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. 
Ultimately, testimony based on specialized knowledge, whether in the form of fact or 
opinion, may be admitted only as expert testimony under rule 702 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence." State v. Rothlisberger. 2006 UT 49, %19, 147 P.3d 1176. 
In the instant matter, Kraft was ineffective for not only failing to hire an expert 
who could testify to the authenticity of Draper's handwriting, but he was also ineffective 
for failing to object to Cory's opinion that the handwriting on the invoices did belong to 
Draper based upon the fact that Cory was not an expert. Not only should Kraft have hired 
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an expert to testify regarding the handwriting, but he should have objected to Cory 
testifying that he believed the handwriting on the invoices belonged to Draper when Cory 
was not an expert on handwriting. Kraft's failure to do so severely prejudiced Draper and 
cannot be seen as sound trial strategy. Had Kraft hired an expert to testify regarding the 
handwriting on the invoices and objected to Cory's testimony that the handwriting on the 
invoices was Draper's, the outcome of the trial would most likely have been in Draper's 
favor. Therefore, based upon Kraft's failure to do this, his representation of Draper was 
ineffective and Draper should receive a new trial. 
This Court has held, "before we can uphold a conviction it must be supported by a 
quantum of evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged from which the 
factfinder may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Larsen, 
2000 UT App. 106,1J10, 999 P.2d 1252 citing Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 
61, <|5, 975 P.2d 501. Furthermore, "[t]he burden on a defendant challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence is heavy. Defendant "must marshal all of the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, 
including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings 
against an attack." Id. citing State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990). As 
the evidence in this matter has been marshaled herein and below, it is evident that 
insufficient evidence existed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Draper had forged 
the work orders as no expert was hired by Kraft to show that the handwriting on such 
work orders was Draper's. Thus, Draper should be given a new trial in this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
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L DRAPER'S TRIAL COUNSEL 
RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE. 
The Federal and State Constitutions require that counsel render effective 
assistance. U. S. CONST. AMEND. VI and UT. CONST. ART. 1, § 12. The Utah Supreme 
Court has recently determined that, "the purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of 
counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the 
outcome of the proceeding ... any deficiencies in counsel's performance must be 
prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the 
Constitution." State v. Eyre. 2008 UT 16, ^\1, 179 P.3d 792 citing Strickland v. 
Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 691-692, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, " 'a defendant must show 
(1) that counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.'" Wickham v. 
Galetka, 2002 UT 72,1fl9, 61 P.3d 978 {quoting State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 243 (Utah 
1995)); see also Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 686-87, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In making this evaluation, the court must "indulge in the strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance; that is the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." Myers v. 
State, 2004 UT 31, [^20, 94 P.3d 211, citing State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 
1990) {quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
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In the instant case, Draper testified at the Remand Hearing that, at every meeting 
with Kraft, he inquired how the search for an expert was going. Supp. Tr. at pp. 66-67. To 
his detriment, Draper relied on Kraft's advice that he could not find one and that their 
defense was sufficient without one. See, Supp. Tr. at p. 74-75. The Findings credit 
Draper's testimony at the Remand Hearing that Draper and Kraft "did not mutually decide 
against hiring an expert and that counsel told Defendant that they would not have an 
expert because counsel could not find one." See, Exhibit "B" at [^8 (emphasis added). The 
trial court based this finding on two (2) factors, (1) being that Cropp's meticulous records 
indicated no contact with Kraft during the relevant time period and (2) Draper "seemed 
more certain in his memory of events than did counsel." Id. While the trial court found 
this determination to only slightly balance in Draper's favor, it found Draper's memory of 
events to be more credible. Exhibit "B" at *[j9. 
The trial court further found that it was Cropp's expert opinion that Draper was 
"probably not" the author of State's Exhibit 2 and "most probably not" the author of 
State's Exhibits 4 and 6 and that Cropp would have testified as such at trial. Exhibit "B" at 
ffi[16 and 19. The trial court additionally found that "it is possible another qualified expert 
would have reached a different conclusion from Ms. Cropp." Exhibit "B" at Tf20. 
Draper asserts that Kraft was ineffective for failing to hire an expert. 
Furthermore, Cory was the only witness who testified that it was Draper's 
handwriting on the allegedly forged documents. The following questioning took place at 
trial between the State and Cory: 
Q. And based on your interaction with the defendant, are you 
familiar with what his handwriting looks like? 
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A. I am. 
Q. Could you compare that knowledge that you have with the 
description of the work that was performed on those three 
documents [State's Exhibit No. 2,4, and 6]? 
A. Yes. It appears to be his handwriting. 
Tr. at p. 67. Cory had worked at Air Comfort four (4) months prior to the incident leading 
to Draper's arrest and further testified that work orders, such as the exhibits offered at 
trial, were always turned into the service tech and not to him. See, Tr. at pp. 73 and 77. 
Thus, Draper asserts that Kraft was ineffective counsel for failing to object and require 
that adequate foundation be laid when Cory testified that the handwriting on the Exhibits 
was Draper's. 
Draper is entitled to effective assistance of counsel as mandated by U. S. CONST. 
AMEND. VI and UT. CONST. ART. 1, § 12. Furthermore, Kraft should have provided 
assistance to Draper that would have justified Draper's reliance on the outcome of the 
trial. Eyre at [^17. Additionally, Kraft's performance fell below the objective standard of 
reasonableness. Wickham at |19. As further argued post, Draper's reliance on Kraft's 
deficient performance was prejudicial to Draper's defense and constituted ineffective 
assistance. Id. However, while this Court must indulge in the strong presumption that 
Kraft's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, Draper 
overcomes this presumption herein by demonstrating that Kraft's actions cannot be 
considered to be sound trial strategy. Myers at [^20. 
A. KRAFT WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO CALL AN EXPERT 
HANDWRITING ANALYST. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has held the following concerning a showing of 
ineffective counsel on appeal: 
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In proving that trial counsel was ineffective, "[Defendant must overcome 
the strong presumption that his trial counsel rendered adequate assistance, 
by persuading the court that there was no conceivable tactical basis for 
counsel's actions." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25,%69 89 P.3d 162 (alteration, 
emphasis, quotations, and citations omitted). "[Tjactical decisions such as 
'what witnesses to call, what objections to make, and, by and large, what 
defenses to interpose, are generally left to the professional judgment of 
counsel.' " Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, «p5, 123 P.3d 400 (quoting State v. 
Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 91 (Utah 1982)). "[Strategic choices made after 
thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are 
virtually unchallengable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 
State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App. 184, ^38, 163 P.3d 695. The Utah Supreme Court has 
stated as follows concerning their responsibility to investigate: 
[C]ounsel has an important duty to "adequately investigate the underlying 
facts" of the case because investigation sets the foundation for counsel's 
strategic decisions about how to build the best defense. As explained by the 
United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
686-87, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), [Strategic choices made 
after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options 
are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than 
complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable 
professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other 
words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. 
State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, f69, 152 P.3d 321. In Hales, Hales' trial counsel failed to call 
an expert witness to present evidence related to the CT Scan taken of the victim in that 
matter. The Utah Supreme court reviewed the decision of Hales' trial counsel to not 
further investigate the CT scan to determine whether or not this decision was that of 
reasonable professional judgment. By doing this, the Court attempted to "eliminate the 
distorting effects of hindsight" by adopting the perspective of trial counsel when they 
decided to limit their investigation. Id. at f 70. Hales continues as follows: 
Under Strickland, even when counsel's performance is inadequate, a 
defendant who has been convicted of a crime is not entitled to a new trial 
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unless the defendant establishes that "there is a reasonable probability that, 
absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt 
respecting guilt." "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the [jury verdict]." Because "[s]ome errors will 
have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, 
altering the entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an isolated 
trivial effect," in determining the effect of the error, we "consider the 
totality of the evidence before the ... jury." 
Hales at [^86. The Utah Supreme Court ultimately ruled the Hales' counsel had been 
ineffective and remanded the matter for a new trial. 
In a case that relied primarily on the victim's testimony, the Utah Supreme Court 
held the following: 
Several courts have held that criminal defendants have been denied the right 
to assistance of counsel in situations where counsel did not make a 
reasonable investigation into the possibility of obtaining prospective defense 
witnesses. [See State v. Tapia, 151 Ariz. 62, 725 P.2d 1096, 1097-98 (1986); 
People v. Cole, 775 P.2d 551, 554-55 (Colo. 1989); State v. Crestani, 111 
P.2d 1085, 1091 (Utah Ct.App.1989)]. This is because a decision not to 
investigate cannot be considered a tactical decision. It is only after an 
adequate inquiry has been made that counsel can make a reasonable decision 
to call or not to call particular witnesses for tactical reasons. 
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) (footnotes included). 
In the instant case, Kraft determined to rely on Matheny's criminal record for 
Draper's defense. While Draper ultimately relied on Kraft's advice to proceed without an 
expert, because Kraft could not locate one, his reliance was misplaced in that Kraft did not 
investigate hiring an expert. The trial court found that Draper and Kraft "did not mutually 
decide against hiring an expert, and that counsel told Draper that they would not have an 
expert because counsel could not find one." Exhibit "B" at ^8. 
Furthermore, the trial court found Draper's testimony at the Remand Hearing to be 
more credible than Kraft's. Id. at | 9 . The trial court made this determination in part based 
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upon Cropp's testimony and her meticulous record keeping—which contradicted Kraft's— 
that Kraft had not called her during the relevant time period to discuss any case. Id. at [^8. 
The trial court found that Draper continually asserted that he would like to hire a 
handwriting expert and never relinquished in his request, but that Kraft told him he was 
unable to locate one. Id. at fflf 4-5. Kraft also told Draper, according to Draper's 
testimony, that he had done everything possible to find an expert. Id. at %5. Draper and 
Kraft both testified at the Remand Hearing that the main point of the case was whether 
Draper was the author of the alleged forged documents. See, Supp. Tr. at pp. 4 and 69. 
Therefore, there was no conceivable tactical basis for Kraft's actions because Kraft did 
not decide not to hire an expert after thoroughly investigating the law and facts relevant to 
Draper's plausible options in a forgery case. Johnson at \ 38. 
It can reasonably be inferred that, in a forgery case, an expert handwriting analyst 
testifying for a defendant would be an invaluable defense. Furthermore, as evidenced by 
the Rule 23B Motion, counsel herein located three (3) possible experts in a period of two 
(2) months while Kraft had been unable to locate one (1) expert in the fifteen (15) months 
preceding Draper's trial. See, Affidavit of Barton J. Warren. Therefore, for Kraft to not be 
able to locate an expert witness to testify on Draper's behalf constitutes a performance 
falling below the objective standard of reasonableness and cannot be construed as a 
tactical or strategic decision. Id. and Wickham at [^19, supra. 
Furthermore, Kraft had an important duty to adequately investigate the underlying 
facts of Draper's case. Hales at }^69. This is an important duty because this investigation 
would have set a foundation for Kraft's strategic decision on how to build the best defense 
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for Draper. Id Kraft's failure to thoroughly investigate the law and facts or find an expert, 
which was relevant to Draper's plausible options before trial, is challengeable because 
Kraft did not make a reasonable investigation into hiring an expert and therefore could not 
have made a reasonable decision not to hire an expert for any other reason based on this 
failure. Id. Thus, even if this Court adopted Kraft's perspective before trial, this Court 
could not find that Kraft made a reasonable and professional decision not to hire an 
expert, because he did not investigate the possibility. Id. at f70. Furthermore, a decision 
not to investigate is not a tactical decision. Templin at 186. Thus, Kraft rendered 
ineffective assistance to Draper in this matter. 
Had the jury heard expert testimony that Draper was not the author of the alleged 
forged documents, which was a critical issue of the case, the jury most likely would have 
acquitted Draper accompanied by the evidence of Matheny's criminal record. The jury 
could not entertain Draper's defense that Matheny was the author of the alleged forged 
documents because Cory testified that the handwriting was Draper's and such testimony 
went uncontroverted. Thus, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have 
acquitted Draper had an expert, such as Cropp, who found that Draper was "probably not" 
and "most probably not" the author of the alleged forged documents, testified at trial in 
contravention to Cory's testimony. This probability cannot be ignored while considering 
Kraft's ineffectiveness. 
Since Kraft failed to find an expert for Draper, this failure also affected the 
outcome of Draper's trial. Kraft presented no witnesses to testify on Draper's behalf and 
Draper opted not to testify. However, had an expert such as Cropp been called to refute 
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Cory's assertion that the writing on the alleged forged documents was Draper's, there is a 
reasonable probability that the jury would have entertained reasonable doubt respecting 
Draper's guilt. Cropp testified at the Remand Hearing that Draper was "probably not" and 
"most probably not" the author of the alleged forged documents. Exhibit "B" at f 16. Such 
testimony would have been of great weight with the jury. Therefore, with Cropp's 
testimony as part of the large evidentiary picture, there is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the Verdict. Hales at Tf86. 
The absence of Cropp's testimony is not an isolated trivial effect on the evidentiary 
picture, but alters it in its entirety. Id. Hence, had an expert who testified as Cropp did at 
the Remand Hearing, the jury would have had reasonable doubt respecting Draper's guilt 
and, as such, Kraft's ineffectiveness in not calling an expert witness affected the Verdict. 
Therefore, this case should be remanded for a new trial. 
B. KRAFT WAS FURTHER INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT 
OR REQUIRE THAT ADEQUATE FOUNDATION BE LAID FOR A 
LAY PERSON TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT. 
UT. R. EVID. 701 states as follows: 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the 
form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences 
which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) 
helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the 
determination of a fact in issue. 
UTAH R. EVID. 702 reads, "if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." 
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The Utah Supreme Court has found that UTAH R. EVID. 701 "does not allow for 
admission of testimony based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. 
Ultimately, testimony based on specialized knowledge, whether in the form of fact or 
opinion, may be admitted only as expert testimony under rule 702 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence." State v. Rothlisbergen 2006 UT 49, f29, 147 P.3d 1176. Rothlisberger further 
holds and instructs, "the test for determining whether testimony must be provided by an 
expert is whether the testimony requires that the witness have scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge; in other words, whether an average bystander would be able 
to provide the same testimony." Id at [^34. Rothlisberger further clarifies, "[tjhus, the real 
distinction must be based on the level of knowledge that witnesses have from which they 
can draw their conclusions. If that knowledge is not within the ken of the average 
bystander, then it is properly characterized as specialized knowledge." Id. The Utah 
Supreme Court has previously held, "[r]ule 701 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows a 
lay witness to give an opinion when it is rationally based on the witness's perception and 
helpful to a clear understanding of the testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." 
State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1987) citing UTAH R. EVID. 701. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has found, "[wjhile testimony in the form of an opinion 
... is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue, it does not follow that such 
testimony is automatically admissible." State ex rel. A.M.D., 2006 UT App. 457, f 19, 153 
P.3d 724; see UTAH R. EVID. 702; Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1232 n. 7 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991) (noting that not all ultimate issue opinions are admissible because the 
opinion must still "assist the trier of fact") (internal quotations and citations omitted). The 
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Utah Supreme Court has held, "[ujnder rule 702, the question that must be posed prior to 
the admission of any expert evidence is whether, on balance, the evidence will be helpful 
to the finder of fact." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993) citing State v. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 398 n. 8 (Utah 1989); see Dixon, 658 P.2d at 598 (internal 
quotations omitted). 
In the instant case, three (3) Air Comfort customers were found to be in possession 
of allegedly forged work orders. See, State's Exhibits No. 2, 4, and 6. Cory testified that 
the usual procedure for cash payment required the work order to be signed by the 
customer and the Air Comfort technician is responsible to alert the office that he is in 
possession of a cash receipt. Tr. at p. 60. When the cash payment is brought to the office 
by the technician, the technician is required to sign and initial "from whoever received the 
cash, and it's usually the accountants or the dispatch service coordinator." Tr. at p. 61. 
However, Cory testified as follows: 
Q. And based on your interaction with the defendant, are you 
familiar with what his handwriting looks like? 
A. I am. 
Q. Could you compare that knowledge that you have with the 
description of the work that was performed on those three 
documents [State's Exhibit No. 2, 4, and 6]? 
A. Yes. It appears to be his handwriting. 
Tr. at p. 67. Kraft did not object to Cory's testimony. See, id Furthermore, Cory testified 
that the work orders were handed to the service coordinator, Matheny (who is in prison for 
fraud related crimes). Tr. at p. 77. It appears from the record that the only time Cory had 
seen Draper's handwriting was when Cory compared Air Comfort's copy of the work 
order to Goff s receipt. Tr. at pp. 68, 71. Cory then began to investigate; however, he had 
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only been working at Air Comfort for four (4) months prior. Tr. at p. 73. Therefore, Cory 
could not have been familiar with Draper's handwriting, particularly when a crime of 
forgery is at issue. Draper and Kraft both testified at the Remand Hearing that main point 
of the case was whether Draper was the author of the alleged forged documents. See, 
Supp. Tr. at pp. 4 and 69. 
Before testifying at the Remand Hearing, Cropp analyzed samples of Draper's 
handwriting using exemplars of Draper's writing before the incident resulting in trial 
occurred. Supp. Tr. at p. 32. She also tested Draper's handwriting. Id. Combined with her 
training and her analysis, Cropp determined that, while Draper's signature appears on the 
alleged forged documents, Draper was "probably not" and "most probably not" the author. 
See, Exhibit "B" at f 16. Cropp further testified that it would not be in the lay person's 
purview to be able to see through a forgery. Supp. Tr. at p. 54. However, Cropp testified 
that a lay person could sometimes recognize handwriting with which they are familiar. 
Supp. Tr. at p. 56 (emphasis added). 
While lay witnesses often testify as to their opinions, such testimony is restricted to 
opinions that are rationally based on the perception of the witness and whether the opinion 
is helpful to trier of fact to determine a fact in issue. UTAH R. EVID. 701. Expert opinion 
is given by qualified individuals and is based on scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue. UTAH R. EVID. 702. Thus, UTAH R. EVID. 701 does not allow for admission 
of testimony based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. Rothlisberger 
at f29. Since Cropp, an expert handwriting analyst, testified that it would not be in the lay 
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person's purview to be able to see through a forger, Cory's testimony was in the realm of 
what the jury construed as "specialized knowledge" and inappropriately relied upon 
Cory's testimony in its Verdict. See, Supp. Tr. at p. 54. Cory was not familiar enough to 
testify as he did concerning Draper's handwriting for two (2) reasons: (1) he had been at 
Air Comfort for only four (4) months, and (2) the work orders that contained Draper's and 
other technicians' handwriting were turned into the dispatch service coordinator and not 
regularly seen by Cory. Tr. at pp. 73 and 77. 
Therefore, Kraft was ineffective for failing to object to Cory's testimony and/or 
require that adequate foundation be laid for Cory to make such an assertion, particularly 
when Kraft did not call any witnesses or introduce evidence that would contradict Cory's 
testimony that Draper was the author of the alleged forged documents. Furthermore, it is a 
reasonable probability, as argued supra, that, had Cory's testimony been refuted by an 
expert or proper lay witness testimony, the Verdict would have been different. And, as 
such, Kraft's failure affected the Verdict. 
Moreover, Cory testified that it was Draper's handwriting on the alleged forged 
documents required that Cory have scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
especially in light of the crimes with which Draper was charged. Rothlisberger at [^34. 
Cropp testified that it would not be in the lay person's purview to be able to see through a 
forgery. Supp. Tr. at p. 54. Cory was going through the work orders in order to further 
determine if other Air Comfort customers had been treated similarly to Goff. The nature 
of a fraud is to make something appear what it is not. Thus, Cory could not have testified 
that he was familiar enough with Draper's handwriting to identify the handwriting on the 
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alleged forged documents as Draper's without specialized knowledge like that which 
Cropp possesses. Hence, an average bystander, in this case Cory, would not be able to 
provide the same testimony as Cropp, who is highly trained in handwriting analysis and 
forged documents. Rothlisberger at f34. Since Cropp's knowledge is not within the ken of 
an average bystander, her knowledge is thus specialized and Cory should not have been 
allowed to testify as he did without objection thereto. Id. Therefore, Kraft failed to render 
effective assistance to Draper at trial. 
While UTAH R. EVID. 701 allows a lay witness to given an opinion when it is 
rationally based on the witness' perception, the charges Draper faced at trial reflected a 
critical issue: whether Draper was the author of the alleged documents. Therefore, Cory's 
testimony, while it embraced a critical issue at trial, it does not follow that such testimony 
is automatically admissible. A.M.D. at Tfl9. Therefore, with such knowledge that is within 
Kraft's professional judgment as a criminal attorney, he should have objected to Cory's 
testimony as it requires specialized knowledge. Thus, Kraft's failure to object to Cory's 
lay person testimony fell below the objective standard of reasonableness and, but for 
Kraft's deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the Verdict would 
have been different. Wickham at f 19, supra. 
Had the jury had the State's Exhibits and testimony from the trial without Cory's 
opinion that Draper was the author of the alleged forged documents, the jury reasonably 
could have reached a different conclusion than the Verdict. Furthermore, such failure was 
not trial strategy. Kraft relied on Matheny's criminal record as Draper's defense without 
any testimony by Matheny or any other person regarding her possible involvement. The 
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only testimony that pointed to Draper being the author of the alleged forged documents 
was Cory's. It was the only evidence that linked the State's case. Thus, absent Cory's 
opinion that it was Draper's handwriting on the forged documents, the jury would have 
had no choice but to acquit. 
II. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT DRAPER 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
This Court has stated that, on appeal, it "reviews the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences drawn from that evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and 
reverses only if that evidence is so " 'inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he ... was convicted.' " State v. Souza. 846 P.2d 1313, 1322 (Utah 
App.1993) citing State v. Scheel 823 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah App.1991) (citations omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has determined, "[w]hen the evidence presented is conflicting or 
disputed, the jury serves as the exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the 
weight to be given particular evidence." State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 
1993) citing State v. Myers, 606 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1980); State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 
1032, 1039 (Utah 1987); State v. Logan. 563 P.2d 811, 813 (Utah 1977); State v. Harless. 
23 Utah 2d 128, 459 P.2d 210, 211 (1969). Workman continues as follows: 
Ordinarily, a reviewing court may not reassess credibility or reweigh the 
evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of the jury 
verdict. Logan, 563 P.2d at 813-14, In some unusual circumstances, 
however, a reviewing court may reassess witness credibility. For example, 
"testimony which is inherently improbable may be disregarded, ... but to 
warrant such action there must exist either a physical impossibility of the 
evidence being true, or its falsity must be apparent, without any resort to 
inferences or deductions." Curtis v. DeAtley, 104 Idaho 787, 663 P.2d 1089, 
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1092 (1983) {quoting Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 575, 582 
(1979)); see also Siruta v. Hesston Corp., 232 Kan. 654, 659 P.2d 799, 806 
(1983) (evidence may be disregarded when it is "clearly contrary to some 
immutable law of physics or is hopelessly in conflict with one or more 
established and uncontroverted physical facts"). Thus, a reviewing court 
may evaluate whether the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that it could not support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt Petree, 659 P.2d at 445; see also State v. Webb, 119 P.2d 1108, 1114 
(Utah 1989) (opinion of Stewart, J., stating the position of the Court). 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-501 which is the statue under which Draper was charged 
and convicted, states as follows: 
(2) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: (a) 
alters any writing of another without his authority or utters the altered 
writing; or (b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, 
publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, 
completion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication, or 
utterance: (i) purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent 
or nonexistent; (ii) purports to be an act on behalf of another party with the 
authority of that other party; or (iii) purports to have been executed at a time 
or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a 
copy of an original when an original did not exist. 
This Court has held, "before we can uphold a conviction it must be supported by a 
quantum of evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged from which the 
factfinder may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Larsen, 
2000 UT App. 106,1J10, 999 P.2d 1252 citing Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 
61, Tf5, 975 P.2d 501. Furthermore, "[t]he burden on a defendant challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence is heavy. Defendant "must marshal all of the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, 
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including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings 
against an attack." Id. citing State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990). 
Draper has marshaled all of the evidence in this matter in the Statement of Facts, 
supra. In the instant case, Dunyon, Hansen, and Goff identified Draper as the technician 
whom Air Comfort sent to perform their respective repairs. Dunyon's air conditioner was 
repaired and worked properly after Draper worked on it. Dunyon did not complain about 
the price or how the work was performed. Tr. at pp. 21-22. Hansen's furnace also worked 
properly after Draper repaired it. Tr. at p. 33. Hansen was also satisfied with the work 
Draper performed. Id. Dunyon and Hansen were unaware of any discrepancy there may 
have been in their bill until they were contacted by Cory later on. While Goff s air 
conditioning unit still didn't work after Draper's attempts, there was testimony at trial that 
Draper performed work. Tr. at pp. 48-50. 
Dunyon testified that she had signed one (1) receipt for Draper on June 29, 2005, 
and received one (1) receipt from him. Tr. at p. 18. Dunyon testified that the capacitor of 
her air conditioner was empty and cost $133.55 for its repair. Tr. at p. 20. Dunyon also 
testified that there was a $50.00 diagnostic fee, which totaled $183.55 for the total repair. 
Tr. at pp. 20-21. Hansen signed the receipt, State's Exhibit No. 5, which indicates a 
$35.00 diagnostic fee and $32.04 for leveling and calibrating the thermostat, totaling 
$67.04, which Hansen paid in cash. Tr. at p. 27, 33. Goff paid $421.70 in cash, which 
broke down to a charge of $112.91 for replacing a connector; $139.15 for the breaker; a 
20 amp fuse for $25.00; and, an unintelligible entry for $119.64; altogether totaling 
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$431.70. Tr. at p. 52. Draper dropped the price down $10.00 to give Goff "a break." Tr. at 
pp. 46-47. Goff testified he signed State's Exhibit No. 1. Tr. at pp. 45-46. 
Norton complained to Cory about Goff s bill. Tr. at p. 68. Cory began to go 
through Air Comfort work orders for the preceding months for cash payments to see if 
there were further discrepancies. Tr. at pp. 68 and 71. Cory contacted Dunyon and 
Hansen and met with them. Tr. at pp. 68-69. Cory testified that a technician's work order 
resulting from a repair is given to the service coordinator who, at the time of the incident, 
was Matheny. Tr. at pp. 77. However, Cory testified that, based on his familiarity of 
Draper's handwriting, it was his opinion that the handwriting on the alleged forged 
documents was Draper's. Tr. at p. 67. Cory is the client fulfillment director for Air 
Comfort. Tr. at p. 56. 
The State put on five (5) witnesses and introduced its six (6) exhibits. Draper did 
not call any witnesses and introduced one (1) exhibit. However, the testimony put forth by 
the State was insufficient for the jury to convict Draper beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
State was required to show that, based on the testimony of its witnesses and evidence of 
its exhibits, Draper had knowledge of fraud or acted with purpose to defraud by altering 
and uttering the forged work orders. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-501. Draper's defense at 
trial was that he turned in the correct work orders and cash given to him by Dunyon, Goff, 
and Hansen, to Matheny, the service coordinator at Air Comfort. Draper introduced 
Matheny's criminal record, which indicated a criminal record for forgery related crimes. 
At the time of his trial, Matheny was residing in prison. While there are obvious 
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deficiencies of Draper's counsel at trial, the evidence presented to the jury was not 
sufficient to support the Verdict. 
The State presented inconclusive testimony and evidence that Draper committed 
forgery. See, Souza at 1322. The State presented evidence that discrepancies had occurred 
but not who was responsible for them. Draper conceded that he was the technician who 
performed the repairs for the victims of this case. However, the State failed to point out to 
the court that Draper turned the in the alleged forged documents to Matheny. Furthermore, 
Matheny's criminal record for forgery-related crimes, coupled with her position of 
handling work orders and cash payments, casts reasonable doubt on Draper's culpability 
in this matter. Thus, reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
Draper committed forgery. Id, 
Draper did not present conflicting or disputed evidence in his defense at trial. He 
objected to Cory's opinion that Draper was the author of the alleged forged documents. 
Hence, Draper introduced and admitted Matheny's criminal record to demonstrate that an 
untrustworthy person was handling Air Comfort's cash transactions. Furthermore, Cory 
could not have conclusively testified that Draper was the author of the alleged forged 
documents. Cropp testified that this would not be in the purview of a lay person. Supp. Tr. 
at p. 54. Thus, in this Court's review of the evidence concerning this claim, this Court 
should reject Cory's opinion that Draper was author of the alleged forged documents and 
reverse Draper's convictions in this matter. Souza at 1322; see also Workman at 985. 
The State failed to present a quantum of evidence concerning each element of 
forgery beyond a reasonable doubt. It failed to prove that Draper uttered the alleged 
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forged documents as required by the forgery statute. While it could link Draper to the 
customers, it could not establish that Draper submitted forged work orders to Matheny or 
anyone else responsible for transactions at Air Comfort. Therefore, Draper has 
demonstrated herein that his conviction is not supported by a quantum of evidence 
concerning each element of forgery upon which the jury based its Verdict. Larsen at ^ 10. 
Thus, since Draper has marshaled that the evidence is insufficient, this Court must 
reverse his convictions. Id 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, Draper respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the Verdict in this matter and take any such further action as this Court deems 
necessary. 
DATED this 31st day of October, 2008. 
<^^yim\ 
Barton J . /^ r ren 
AttomeyTor Ryan Draper 
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Minutes, dated January 22, 2007 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RYAN LEON DRAPER, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051905149 FS 
Judge: SHEILA K MCCLEVE 
Date: January 22, 2 0 07 
PRESENT 
Clerk: nicolel 
Prosecutor: COLBY, MICHAEL S 
Defendant 
Defendants Attorney (s) : KRAFT, ROGER A 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 21, 19 81 
Video 
Tape Number: 1/22/07 Tape Count: 10:10 
CHARGES 
1. FORGERY - 3rd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 10/26/2006 Guilty 
2. FORGERY - 3rd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 10/26/2006 Guilty 
3. FORGERY - 3rd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 10/26/2006 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FORGERY a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendants conviction of FORGERY a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant 4 s sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to 
exceed five ypars in the Utah State Prison. ^-^- ^ 
The prison t^rm is suspended. ^\^ r- ' , 
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Based on the defendant's conviction of FORGERY a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Prison concurrent to one another. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FORGERY a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to a term of 4 5 day(s) 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
Defense motion to stay jail based on appeal denied. Jail sentence 
forthwith. 
Restitution Amount: $431.74 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: VICTIM 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month (s) . 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 45 day(s) jail. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with 'any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drug£\ 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
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Enforcement Officer. 
Participate in and complete any educational- *„*/« 
training
 a s directed b y t h e r ^ ^ S T i U . S ^ b E E S 1 ^ 
Violate no laws 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where druas are used , n i . „ 
distributed illegally 9 ' S o l d' o r °therwise 
S f ' T * f ^ ° m t h S U S e ° f a l c o h o l i ^ beverages. 
H e ; t ^ ^ S ^ ? a s e S S r a ^ v ; S d b r S e e S u ^ e o ? ? ? ^ a ? J 
Defendant to obtain and maintain employment 
Dated this dZdR day of <^<wuau{ 
_, 2 Q C 7 • 
I CERJTfY THAT TJHIS JS A TflUE COffe *>F 
THTp&t f tSWCT COURT. SALT tAKE 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FILED IMITIHCT COURT 
Tntrd Judicial District 
JUL H 2008 
«MJUME( 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ^ ]}***<** 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
3f£ 
STATE OF UTAH, FINDINGS OF FA(JT 
Plaintiff, Case No. 05190514P 
v
- Judge Sheila K. McCfcve 
RYAN LEON DRAPER, Date: July 14,2008 
Defendant. 
This matter is before the Court on remand from the Court of Appeals for the linited purpose of 
entering findings of fact regarding counsel's failure to call an expert witness at trial J Based upon an 
evidentiary hearing held on June 6,2008, the Court enters the following findings of factj 
1. Defendant retained Mr, Kraft ("counsel") to represent him when Defendant was charged with three 
counts of forgery and three counts of theft by deception. 
2. One of the primary issues at trial was whether Defendant was the author of forged vf ork orders which 
were at issue; Exhibits 2, 4, and 6 at trial. 
3. Defendant and counsel both testified at the evidentiary hearing that they had discus Jed the possibility 
of hiring a handwriting expert to analyze whether Defendant forged the numbers on the work orders, 
4. Defendant asserts that throughout his meetings with counsel, he continually asserted that he would 
like to hire a handwriting expert. Defendant testified that he never relinquished this request. 
5. Defendant also testified that he did not have an expert testify at trial because couAsel told him that 
he been unable to find an expert. Defendant said that he asked if he could do anything personally 
to find an expert. Counsel told Defendant that counsel had done everything possible to find an 
expert. 
6. Conversely, counsel testified that he and Defendant mutually decided not hire anfexpert due to (1) 
the cost of hiring an expert; (2) the fact thatthe State did not intend to present expdt testimony; and 
(3) counsel's belief that Defendant's case was sufficiently strong without an expert, 
7. Counsel also testified that he had always been able to find an expert and had nevdt indicated to the 
contrary to Defendant or anyone else. Counsel specifically stated that he had spoken with Ms. 
Cropp, a handwriting expert, regarding another case and could have consulted ijsr in this case if 
necessary. 
8. The Court credits Defendant's testimony regarding the decision to not hire an oxpert witness to 
testify at trial for two reasons. First, counsel's testimony is inconsistent with IV* Cropp's. Ms. 
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Cropp testified that she kept meticulous retords of all phone calls she received anB that she did not 
have a record of counsel contacting her at all during the relevant time period Sacond, Defendant 
seemed more certain in his memory of events than did counsel. Therefore, thej Court finds that 
Defendant and counsel did not mutually decide against hiring an expert and mat counsel told 
Defendant that they would not have an expert because counsel could not find ond 
9. The Court notes that the credibility determination here is not an easy one to make,. The Court does 
not believe that either party was deliberately trying to mislead the Court in recititg their different 
versions of events. Additionally, the Court finds that each party sincerely believdd that the events 
had happened the way each depicted them. However, the Court must make la determination 
regarding credibility and that determinationultimately balances, though only slightly, in Defendant's 
favor. 
10. The record is then clear on what happened a* trial. Neither the State nor Defendantbresented expert 
testimony regarding the handwriting on the forged instruments- The only testimony presented was 
that of Defendant's employer who testified without ohjection, that the handwriting on the forged 
documents looked like Defendant's. No testimony refuted this statement. 
11. Defendant did not testify, based on a strategic decision made by Defendant and counsel. 
12. Counsel's primary theory of the case was that another employee named Nicohl ,who had been 
convicted of forgery and whose initials appeared on all the invoices in question, had peen responsible 
for the forgery. 
13. Defendant was convicted of three counts o | forgery, third degree felonies. He wa$ acquitted of the 
misdemeanor theft by deception charges. 
14. Following Defendant's conviction, his appellate counsel retained Ms- Cropp to anllyze Exhibits 2, 
4, and 6 compared to Defendant's handwriting and to form an opinion regarding wrfether Defendant 
was the author of the forged invoices. 
15. Ms Cropp testified at the evidentiary hearing that she had compared Defendant's handwriting 
samples with the handwriting on the invoices. 
16. Ms. Cropp testified that as to Exhibit 2, Defendant was "probably not" the author a»d as to Exhibits 
4 and 6, Defendant was "most probably nor the author. 
17. Short of having observed the actual creatitfn of the invoices, "most probably noflwas the highest 
level of certainty Ms. Cropp could assign to the invoices against a finding that Defendant was the 
author. 
18. Though handwriting experts do not assign levels of certainty based on percentages, Ms. Cropp 
testified that "most probably not written by* was akin to over 90% certainty that D<|fendant was not 
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theauthor. She ftirther stated tirat probably not written by** equated to approximately 80% or higher 
certainty that Defendant was not the authof of the invoices. 
19. The Court finds that, had Ms, Cropp been galled to testify at trial, she would ha j^e testified as she 
testified at the evidentiary hearing. 
20, Additionally, based on Ms. Cropp's testimony, the Court finds that it is likely anckher expert, with 
similar training and experience, would have testified similarly to Ms. Cropp. ThdCourt also finds 
that it is possible that another qualified expert would have reached a different conilusion from Ms. 
